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Judicial Influence on the Duty to Consult
and Accommodate
ANDREW GREEN*
The duty to consult and accommodate has increasingly become front and centre in a
wide range of resource and development projects and the related litigation. The Supreme
Court of Canada has stated that it seeks to foster negotiation and limit litigation through
its approach to the duty. This article examines, from a theoretical perspective, whether the
Court is furthering this objective. It builds on a simple model of How the legislature and
courts interact in the administrative law context and discusses how the relationship changes
with the addition of Indigenous peoples seeking enforcing the government’s constitutional
duty to consult and accommodate. It examines both decisions made by Cabinet and by
an “independent” body such as the Canada Energy Regulator (CER). The model points to
the importance of both the approach taken by the reviewing court and the relative political
positions of relevant actors. The interpretation of the standard of review by different types
of judges will impact the incentives to litigate and the probability of success from litigation.
In addition, the incentive to litigate shifts as policy positions shift for Cabinet, for boards
or for judges, but not in a straightforward fashion. The model informs not only the duty to
consult, but judicial review in the standard administrative law context and involving other
constitutional issues.
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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS HAVE INCREASINGLY become front and centre in Canada.

Proposed resource-related projects, for example, from mines to pipelines to
exploration activity, have the potential to impinge on claimed or accepted
Indigenous rights. A central feature of Aboriginal law’s attempts to deal with
disputes about such projects is the constitutional duty on the Crown to consult
and accommodate Indigenous peoples prior to undertaking conduct that may
adversely affect a potential Aboriginal claim or Aboriginal or treaty right.1 The
duty to consult and accommodate has led not only to considerable negotiation
and discussions around proposed projects but also to a large amount of litigation.
The courts in Canada have struggled to find the right balance in their role
in overseeing the duty to consult and accommodate. A key barrier is the need to
recognize the constitutional nature of the duty (and hence a strong role for the
courts) while at the same time fostering negotiations, as opposed to litigation,
between the Crown and Indigenous groups. As the Supreme Court of Canada
has stated, “No one benefits—not project proponents, not Indigenous peoples,
and not non-Indigenous members of affected communities—when projects are
prematurely approved only to be subjected to litigation.”2 The Court attempts
to provide a backstop to consultations over resource development, encouraging
the Crown and Indigenous peoples to negotiate through both its vision of the
content of the duty and its stance on judicial review of the resulting decisions.
In this, is the Court doing what it thinks it is doing? As Janna Promislow and
Naiomi Metallic note, “The perennial question surrounding the duty to consult is
1.

2.

See Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law” in
Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed (Emond, 2018)
87 at 89 [Promislow & Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law”]. Promislow and
Metallic state that: “‘Indigenous law’ is increasingly used as an umbrella term encompassing
the specific legal orders of Indigenous nations,” while “‘Aboriginal’ [law] signifies that the law
of the Canadian state is the subject at hand,” such as the Constitution (ibid).
Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at para 24 [Clyde River].
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whether the court prescribed enough content to tilt the risk management equation
in favour of the protection of Aboriginal rights, and cast a long enough shadow
to improve the political climate for negotiations.”3 Does the Court’s stance on
the duty to consult and accommodate actually tend to foster negotiations? Even
if so, does it advantage one side or the other in those negotiations? In one sense,
the answer to the second question is clearly “yes,” as the Court has consistently
stated that the duty does not provide Indigenous peoples with a veto over the
proposed government action. Instead, the Court has stated that accommodation
“stress[es] the need to balance competing societal interests with Aboriginal and
treaty rights.”4 However, can we say more about the impact of the Court’s choices
on the relative power and decisions made by the various parties involved?
Central to answering this question is the stance the Court takes to reviewing
decisions relating to consultation and accommodation. As we will see, the Court
takes a hybrid approach: For some questions, it tells judges to adopt their own
view of the “correct” answer, while on others, it says the judges are to defer to
executive decision makers, such as Cabinet. This issue of the appropriate “standard
of review” to be adopted by courts is heavily contested, generally, and similarly
controversial in the context of the duty to consult. A number of scholars, such as
Promislow, for example, point to the need to reconsider the Court’s deferential
approach to reviewing duty to consult cases.5 Further, Metallic notes that
“administrative law rules that have developed around deference tend to place
Indigenous peoples at a disadvantage in judicial review proceedings,” as they

3.
4.
5.

“Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law,” supra note 1 at 119.
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 50 [Haida]. See
also Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 at para
59 [Chippewas].
See Janna Promislow, “Delegation, Deference and Difference: In Search of a Principled
Approach to Implementing and Administering Aboriginal Rights” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d)
139 at 150-1. See also Kate Glover Berger, “Diagnosing Administrative Law: A Comment
on Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames First Nation” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d)107; David
Mullan, “The Supreme Court and the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: A Lifting of
the Fog?” (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 233 (discussing the nature of the standard of
review in duty to consult cases); Audrey Macklin, “Standard of Review: Back to the Future?”
in Flood & Sossin, supra note 1, 381 (discussing the inconsistencies in the approach to the
standard of review between administrative law, generally, and the duty to consult context).
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involve deference to regulatory regimes that are skewed towards settler interests.6
This article aims to provide some insight into the basic pressures and incentives
the Court has created in this area.
Part I provides a brief summary of the law concerning the duty to consult
and accommodate. It does not explore all the nuances but attempts to lay out
the broader pattern of the role taken on by the courts. Part II then sets out
a basic model of how the Crown, Indigenous peoples, the legislature, and the
courts interact when Cabinet makes a decision. Prior political science literature
has created models of such decision making in the US administrative law context.
This article builds on these simple models to examine the Canadian administrative
law context and extends the analysis to discuss constitutionalizing the decision
through the duty to consult. Part III then takes that model to the situation
where the Crown relies on an “independent” body, such as a board, to fulfill
the duty to consult. Part IV discusses the implication of this model for how we
think about the role of the courts, given that negotiations and reconciliation
occur in the shadow of judicial review. The model also has implications for both
administrative law more generally, as well as for other constitutional litigation,
such as challenges to administrative decisions that involve the Charter.7

6.

7.

“Deference and Legal Frameworks Not Designed By, For or With Us” (2018) 31 Can
J Admin L & Prac: Special Issue 159 [Metallic, “Legal Frameworks”] (stating that this
argument does not preclude deference but just blanket deference to expertise to all decision
makers). See also Matthew J Hodgson, “Pursuing a Reconciliatory Administrative Law:
Aboriginal Consultation and the National Energy Board” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall LJ
125 (“[t]he extent to which the NEB’s process and reasons provide a sufficient basis for
curial deference in these cases is, therefore, critically important to ensure just outcomes for
Aboriginal claimants” (at 152)). Hodgson argues that if there is deference, the discretion
exercised must take into account the constitutional nature of the duty.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND
ACCOMMODATE
For the Supreme Court, the duty to consult originates in section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 and is founded on the honour of the Crown.8 The goal
is to promote reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the Crown as well
as to “identify, minimize and address adverse impacts where possible.”9 The duty
requires good faith on all sides to ensure that the consultation and, if possible,
accommodation is meaningful.10
In Haida, the Court set out what has become a three-part test for when the
duty is triggered.11 First, the Crown must have actual or constructive knowledge
of a potential Aboriginal claim or Aboriginal or treaty rights. Second, there
must be Crown conduct that has the potential to impact this claim or right.
Crown conduct includes not only decisions of Cabinet or line departments
but also decisions of executive decision makers, such as the National Energy
Board (NEB)—now called the Canada Energy Regulator (CER), that are given
power under statutes, whether or not they are the final decision makers.12 The
Court looks beyond the claims of “independence” of these executive bodies for
the purposes of this trigger for the duty (stating, for example, that “as the NEB
operates independently of the Crown’s ministers—no relationship of control
exists between them”), focusing on their purpose of implementing government
policy.13 However, as we will see, the Court brings back in an assumption of
independence in its view of the court’s role in the process. Finally, the Crown
conduct must have a potential adverse effect on the claim or right. Actual,
current effects are covered, but historic impacts are not (although the cumulative

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11; Haida, supra note 4 at para 16.
See generally Promislow & Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law,” supra note 1;
David V Wright, “Federal Linear Energy Infrastructure Projects and the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: Current Legal Landscape and Emerging Developments” (2018) 23 Rev Const Stud
175; Glover Berger, supra note 5; Hodgson, supra note 6.
Clyde River, supra note 2 at paras 19, 25.
Haida, supra note 4 at para 42.
Ibid at para 35.
Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 29. See also Chippewas, supra note 4 at paras 29-31 (the
Court found that it does not matter whether the “Crown” as such is a party before the
particular decision maker, as the NEB was a statutory body and the final decision maker).
Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 29. See also Sari Graben & Abbey Sinclair, “Tribunal
Administration and the Duty to Consult: A Study of the National Energy Board” (2015) 65
UTLJ 382 (discussing expertise and independence in this context).
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effects of a project as well as the historic context may affect the analysis of the
scope of the duty).14
The duty itself is flexible and context dependent. It lies on a spectrum from
limited to deep consultation, depending on the strength of the claim and the
seriousness of the potential adverse effect.15 The placement on the spectrum helps
identify what actual processes are required. At the limited end may be notice of
potential decisions and the opportunity to provide comments. At the deep end
of the spectrum, the courts have found that meaningful consultation may require
more in the way of disclosure, oral hearings, funding for groups to participate,
and even the provision of reasons.16 The Court recently found that the NEB had
fulfilled its duty to consult in one case but not in another, both of which the
Court had seen as requiring deep consultation. The Chippewas of the Thames
were adequately consulted given the disclosure and participation involved, NEB’s
oral hearings, and funding of the Indigenous groups involved.17 For the Inuit of
Clyde River, on the other hand, the consultation was inadequate where the Court
found none of these procedural elements were present.18 Further, the Court has
stated that reasons will generally be required in the context of deep consultation.19
Courts seem to base their decision on whether the duty has been met, at least at
the “deep” consultation end of the spectrum, on whether there was “meaningful”
dialogue or whether there were conditions for such dialogue to occur.20 In some
cases, such dialogue may require that “someone” be present on the Crown side
with some authority to speak for the Crown.21
The duty, however, is more than just procedural, at least in theory, as it is
a duty to consult and accommodate—that is, there is a potential need for the
14. Chippewas, supra note 4 at paras 41-42.
15. See Haida, supra note 4 at paras 39-44. The Court has stated that, in determining what the
duty actually entails in a particular context, “regard may be had to the procedural safeguards
of natural justice mandated by administrative law” (ibid at para 41). See also Beckman v Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 [Little Salmon] (“[a]dministrative law is flexible
enough to give full weight to the constitutional interests of the First Nation” at para 47);
Mullan, supra note 5 (pointing out that the structure of the duty to consult and of procedural
fairness for other decisions is very similar).
16. Haida, supra note 4 at para 44.
17. See Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 52.
18. See Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 47.
19. Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 62.
20. See e.g. Clyde River, supra note 2 (“[n]o mutual understanding on the core issues … could
possibly have emerged from what occurred here” at para 49). See also Gitxaala Nation v
Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at paras 325-27 [Gitxaala]; Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (AG),
2018 FCA 153 at paras 754-63 [Tsleil-Waututh].
21. Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 20 at para 759.
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decision maker to change its decisions in some contexts. The Court has stated
on a number of occasions that accommodation does not amount to a veto for
Indigenous groups.22 The aim in accommodation is to attempt to undertake “a
process of balancing interests, of give and take.”23 In addressing concerns that
this balancing may disadvantage Indigenous groups, particularly in decisions that
require the decision maker to focus on the public interest, the Court has stated
that the duty to consult implicates a “[‘]special public interest’ which surpasses
economic concerns,” but that a balance still needs to be struck with societal
interests.24 In the context of the NEB, for example, the Court has stated, “We
do not, however, see the public interest and the duty to consult as operating in
conflict. … A project authorization that breaches the constitutionally protected
rights of Indigenous peoples cannot serve the public interest.”25 Depending
on the context, the Crown may need to act so as to avoid irreparable harm or
minimize adverse impacts.26 However, the Court recently noted that “[w]hile the
goal of the process is reconciliation of the Aboriginal and state interest, in some
cases this may not be possible. The process is one of ‘give and take’, and outcomes
are not guaranteed.”27
Recently, the Court has attempted to clarify who is responsible for fulfilling
the duty to consult. It has clearly stated that the Crown has this responsibility.
The Crown may rely on administrative process or executive decision makers,
including tribunals, to undertake all or part of the duty, provided the Crown
gives notice it is going to rely on that process.28 It may even rely on project
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Haida, supra note 4 at para 48; Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 59.
Haida, supra note 4 at para 48.
Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 59.
Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 40.
Haida, supra note 4 at para 47.
Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017
SCC 54 at para 114 [Ktunaxa]. The Court found that the consultation process by the
minister was not unreasonable and that changes had been made to the proposal, but that
process came to an end because the Ktunaxa “adopted a new, absolute position that no
accommodation was possible … and that only total rejection of the project would satisfy
them” (ibid at para 87).
28. See Clyde River, supra note 2 at paras 22-23. See also Chippewas, supra note 4; Graben &
Sinclair, supra note 13 (discussing the issue of the duty to consult and administrative decision
makers). In Chippewas, the Court found that while notice was not explicitly given that
the Crown would rely on the NEB process, the Chippewa of the Thames were given the
opportunity to participate and did so, knew the NEB was the final decision maker, and were
aware that there was no other Crown actor involved, and so “the circumstances of this case
made it sufficiently clear to the Chippewas of the Thames that the NEB process was intended
to constitute Crown consultation and accommodation” (ibid at para 46).
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proponents for certain procedural elements. However, the responsibility remains
with the Crown.29 The decision maker must not take an action (such as issuing
an approval) if the duty is not met. If the decision maker does not satisfy the duty
to consult, the Crown must take actions to ensure that it is fulfilled prior to any
decision. These actions may include additional consultation, legislative changes,
or making submissions before the regulatory decision maker.30
Whether a particular administrative decision maker has been granted the
power to undertake the duty to consult or to assess whether the duty has been
fulfilled (or both) depends on the powers granted to the decision maker by
statute, including whether the decision maker can decide questions of law and
what remedial powers were given to the decision maker.31 For example, in Clyde
River, the Court found that, while the NEB was created prior to the origins of the
duty to consult, it has a sufficient set of powers to undertake consultation (such
as conducting hearings and granting funding), powers (in this case under another
statute) to accommodate Indigenous concerns through terms and conditions on
or denial of approval, and “developed considerable institutional expertise, both in
conducting consultations and in assessing the environmental impacts of proposed
projects.”32 The Crown could therefore rely on the NEB’s processes to completely
or partially fulfill the duty to consult in that case. Statutory bodies like the NEB
may take on these roles as they are capable of acting as “neutral arbitrator[s]”
according to the Court (a point to which we will return when we discuss the
incentives facing such bodies).33
What is the role of the courts in this process? The Court has stated that
“the question is not whether the [Indigenous groups] obtained the outcome they
sought, but whether the process is consistent with the honour of the Crown.”34
However, in challenges to decisions concerning the duty to consult, while the
Court has seen parallels between consultation and the demands of procedural
fairness,35 it has tended to deal with duty to consult cases within its substantive
review framework—that is, its approach to review of the substance of particular
decisions. Following the Court’s decision in Haida, on the questions of whether
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Haida, supra note 4 at para 53; Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 22.
See Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 32; Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 22.
See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at paras 55-65.
Clyde River, supra note 2 at paras 31-33. See also Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 48 (the
Court found that the NEB’s statutory powers and expertise were sufficient to allow the
Crown to rely in whole or in part on its processes).
33. Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 34.
34. Ktunaxa, supra note 27 at para 83.
35. See Haida, supra note 4 at para 41.
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the duty to consult is triggered and, if so, what is the depth of consultation
required, the Court has tended to use a correctness standard, ostensibly on the
basis that there is a significant legal component to these questions.36 This standard
permits a judge to decide for themselves the correct answer to these questions
with no deference to the initial decision maker, such as Cabinet or the NEB.
However, on the question of whether the appropriate level of consultation
has been achieved with the particular process used (including whether the
accommodation was appropriate), the Court has stated that judges are only to
examine whether the process was reasonable. In Haida, the Court stated that “the
process itself would likely fall to be examined on a standard of reasonableness.
Perfect satisfaction is not required; the question is whether the regulatory scheme
or government action ‘viewed as a whole, accommodates the collective aboriginal
right in question’ … . What is required is not perfection, but reasonableness.”37
In the context of a ministerial decision, the Court more recently reiterated this
standard, stating:38
The Minister’s decision that an adequate consultation and accommodation
process occurred is entitled to deference … . The chambers judge was required to
determine whether the Minister reasonably concluded that the Crown’s obligation
to consult and accommodate had been met. A reviewing judge does not decide the
constitutional issues raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, but asks rather
whether the decision of the Minister, on the whole, was reasonable.

Part of the rationale given for such deference is the nature of the decision and
capability of the Court. The Federal Court of Appeal thus noted in the context of
Cabinet approval of the Northern Gateway Pipeline: 39
In this case, the subjects on which consultation was required were numerous,
complex and dynamic, involving many parties. Sometimes in attempting to fulfil
the duty there can be omissions, misunderstandings, accidents and mistakes.
In attempting to fulfil the duty, there will be difficult judgment calls on which
reasonable minds will differ.

The result therefore is a mixed standard, with correctness used for the decision
as to whether the duty is triggered and the depth of consultation required, and
reasonableness for the content of the process and accommodation.40 Kate Glover
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Little Salmon, supra note 15 at para 48; Haida, supra note 4 at paras 61-63.
Ibid at para 62.
Ktunaxa, supra note 27 at para 77.
Gitxaala, supra note 20 at para 182.
See Glover Berger, supra note 5 (arguing that the standard of review is uncertain in the
context of the duty to consult, with a greater emphasis on correctness).
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Berger argues that this view of the Court of the duty to consult fits with a more
general story of administrative law—that courts have moved from skepticism of
the administrative state to a stance of trust and confidence.41 However, it is not
clear that there was a move in the context of the duty to consult, in that the courts
seemed to have always evinced a basic trust or confidence in the state in fulfilling
this duty. For example, in two of its most recent duty to consult cases, the Court
found the duty to consult was fulfilled in one but not in another, requiring little
of the decision maker (the NEB in each case) in terms of notice and reasons
and rejecting only a very weak attempt at consultation.42 Interestingly, the Court
failed in both cases to discuss the standard of review.
In its discussion of the duty to consult, the Court has focused on the need
to increase the possibility of negotiation and reconciliation and to reduce the
involvement of the courts.43 If there is inadequate consultation, the courts are
to quash the Crown decision, but “judicial review is no substitute for adequate
consultation. True reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms.”44
Expressing a similar need to foster negotiations, the Court noted in the context
of treaty interpretation that:45
In a judicial review concerning the implementation of modern treaties, a court
should simply assess whether the challenged decision is legal, rather than closely
supervise the conduct of the parties at each stage of the treaty relationship.
Reconciliation often demands judicial forbearance. Courts should generally leave
space for the parties to govern together and work out their differences.

The Court recognized that not allowing judicial review to resolve claims will
lead to results that Indigenous groups view as “tragic” but stated that “in the
difficult period between claim assertion and claim resolution, consultation and
accommodation, imperfect as they may be, are the best available legal tools in the
reconciliation basket.”46

41. Ibid.
42. See Chippewas, supra note 4 (duty to consult met); Clyde River, supra note 2 (duty to consult
not met). See also Ktunaxa, supra note 27 (duty to consult also met).
43. See Haida, supra note 4 at para 51.
44. Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 24.
45. First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon, 2017 SCC 58 at para 4.
46. Ktunaxa, supra note 27 at para 86.
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II. CABINET DECISION MAKING AND THE DUTY TO
CONSULT
What can we say about how the principal actors—Indigenous peoples, the
legislature, executive actors such as the Cabinet, and the courts—interact in
the context of the duty to consult and accommodate? Political scientists have
examined how judges, executive decision makers, and legislatures interact
strategically. For example, John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan modelled how an
administrative agency which has been delegated the power to make policy takes
into account the possibility that a judge or Congress may overturn its decision.47
Similarly, agencies interpret statutes in the shadow of judicial review and legislative
override.48 Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, for example, developed a positive
model of statutory interpretation to show how agencies, the courts, the president,
and Congress are all involved in the process of statutory interpretation.49 The
focus has been on administrative decisions or statutory interpretation but not in
a constitutional context.
Building on this literature, we can construct a simple model of how Canadian
policy decisions are made that incorporates the basic structure of administrative
law. Different types of executive decision makers may be involved in fulfilling the
duty to consult, including Cabinet, individual ministers, agencies and boards,
provincial governments, and municipalities. To start with the most clearly
“Crown” decision maker, we will first examine a decision made by Cabinet.
To see the basic outline of the argument, we will begin by considering a decision
that does not affect Indigenous interests. Think, for example, of a decision on
whether to build a pipeline that may adversely affect the environment but not
in a way that gives rise to a duty to consult. We will then use this basic model to
see what happens when we constitutionalize aspects of the decision through the
duty to consult.

47. “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy” (1990) 6 JL Econ & Org 1. See also Charles
R Shipan, “The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis” (2000) 12 J
Theoretical Pol 269 (examining how a legislature can use the existence of judicial review to
influence policy outcomes).
48. For a foundational paper, see William N Eskridge, Jr, “Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game” (1991) 79 Cal L Rev 613.
49. “A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation” (1992) 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 263.
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A. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISIONS

We begin then with a Cabinet decision that does not involve constitutional
issues—that is, for which the duty to consult is not triggered. Suppose the basic
sequence of the decision-making process is as follows:
1. A company proposes the pipeline and applies to an executive
body for approval.
2. The legislature has empowered Cabinet to approve or deny the
application following some decision-making process. Cabinet may
impose conditions on the project. The next step then is for Cabinet
to approve or deny the application, subject to any conditions.
3. If Cabinet approves the pipeline (potentially with limiting
conditions), an environmental group or the proponent has to
decide whether to apply for judicial review of the approval.
4. If one of them applies for judicial review of the decision, a court
then either quashes the decision or allows it to stand.
5. If the court quashes the decision, Cabinet has a choice of
implementing a decision that the court will accept or having
the legislature amend the legislation to allow the approval either
directly or indirectly.50 A key factor in our analysis is that where the
government has a majority, the Cabinet in most cases can determine
whether legislation is proposed and which legislation will pass in
Parliament.51 This power provides Cabinet in the administrative law
setting with the final move.
How will Cabinet decide given the possibility of judicial review? In part,
it will depend on how we think Cabinet and judges decide. To aid in our later
discussion of the duty to consult, assume that Cabinet is seeking to implement
some “national interest” or, even more narrowly, a largely majoritarian vision.
Cabinet has to decide how to maximize its goal. If a court quashes its initial
50. That is, Cabinet proposes legislation that either explicitly allows this project or indirectly
does so by altering the statute to overcome whatever defect the court found in the
decision-making process.
51. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47. In their terms, the Canadian federal government
essentially operates under a “closed rule” in most cases where the government has a
majority—that is, given the centralization of power in the Canadian Parliamentary system,
Cabinet can largely determine the scope of any legislative changes (ibid at 3-4). Any
divergence because of committees or the Senate bring the analysis closer to the “open rule”
discussed by Ferejohn and Shipan (ibid at 5, 8).
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decision, Cabinet faces a range of costs—the direct costs of drafting and
negotiating the revised decision or legislation as well as the costs from any delay
such as a loss of revenue or in some cases, more importantly, a reduction in the
probability that the company will continue with the project.
How judges decide is controversial. There is a vast literature attempting to
tease out theoretically and empirically the determinants of judicial decisions.52
Judges may, for example, be seen to be following the “law” in some sense, naively
deciding according to their preferred policy outcome, strategically following their
preferences by taking into account how other actors (such as the legislature) will
react to a decision, or acting as any other rational actor taking into account not
only their preferred policy but also factors such as their prestige or workload.53
Adapting Ferejohn and Weingast’s approach to statutory interpretation, we use
three basic attitudes that judges may take to judicial review of an administrative
decision rather than choosing a preferred model of how judges decide; namely:
naive deference—where a judge defers to whatever the executive body says is the
optimal policy; sophisticated deference—where a judge exercises deference “as
respect,” such that it does not abdicate responsibility for the decision, but they
are willing to acknowledge a space or range of decisions that may be taken to be
“reasonable”; and, finally, unconstrained policy maximizer—where a judge decides

52. See e.g. Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices
Make (CQ Press, 1998); Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press,
2008); Benjamin Alarie & Andrew J Green, Commitment and Cooperation on High Courts:
A Cross-Country Examination of Institutional Constraints on Judges (Oxford University Press,
2017). For Canadian studies, see Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference
Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ
1; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of
Canada (UBC Press, 2007); Donald R Songer et al, Law, Ideology, and Collegiality: Judicial
Behaviour in the Supreme Court of Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
53. See e.g. Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Behavior of Federal
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Harvard University Press,
2013). In the constitutional context, see Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Quantitative
Analysis of Judicial Voting” in Malcolm Langford & David S Law, eds, Research Methods in
Constitutional Law: A Handbook (Edward Elgar) [forthcoming] (for a discussion of different
models of decision making).
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solely in accordance with their own policy preferences taking into account
whether there will be a political reaction to the decision.54
In order to keep the model simple and bring out the central notion, we need
to make three more sets of assumptions.55 First, we will think of the policy
options as lying along a line. In terms of our example of the pipeline, you could
think of the line setting out policies from less to more development or from less
to more risky. For want of a better short-form term and to tie into the literature
on judicial decision making, we will call decisions more to the left on the line to
be “liberal” decisions and to the right “conservative,” recognizing the imperfect
mapping of this policy domain into such political terms. This reduction of the
policy dimensions obviously abstracts from the polycentric nature of the decisions,
but it allows us to see the strategic interactions. Second, we will initially assume
that the parties are rational and fully informed about the choices of other parties.
Finally, we assume that the political actors prefer that their decisions are not
overturned and cannot commit upfront to a particular course of decisions. This
assumption allows us to see the strategic moves more clearly.
Each decision maker has a preference over the policy positions on the
line, with the strength of preference declining as the policy is further from
their ideal point. In Figure 1, assume that the line arrays potential outcomes
from less development to more development with the optimal policy for the
pipeline company at “P,” the Cabinet at “C,” and the environmental group at
“E.” If there was no judicial review, the proponent would propose P and Cabinet
would respond with approval, but only at C (that is, would approve subject to
conditions such as a reduction in the size of the pipeline or pipeline corridor).

54. Supra note 49 at 268. Ferejohn and Weingast examine three stances of judges to statutory
interpretation: “[n]aïve textualist” (interprets legislation as close as possible to the wishes of
the enacting legislature), “[p]olitically sophisticated honest agent” (aims for an outcome as close
as possible to the wishes of the enacting legislature), and an “[u]nconstrained policy advocate”
(seeks to maximize the judge’s own policy preferences, taking into account whether its
position is politically viable) (ibid [emphasis in original]).
55. See generally Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47.
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FIGURE 1: PREFERENCES OF CABINET, THE PROPONENT, AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP

NOTES: The line provides the array of possible policy outcomes from least development on the
left to most development on the right. The points represent the preferred outcomes for

an environmental group (“E”), Cabinet (“C”), and the proponent (“P”). “C1” is the
outcome preferred by Cabinet minus the cost of delay (including loss of government
revenue and the decreased probability that the pipeline will be built) and “C2” is the
point to the right of C where Cabinet is indifferent to C1.

Now consider what happens when we introduce the possibility of judicial
review of the approval. Once Cabinet chooses its preferred policy, both the
environmental group and the proponent have the possibility of applying to the
court to overturn the decision. In order to understand the impact of judicial
review, we need to think about three factors. First, what is the type of judge—are
they naively deferential, sophisticated in their deference, or a policy maximizer?
Second, what are the preferences or views of the judge relative to the other
actors—and, in particular, Cabinet? You can think of the position of the judge
on the line as indicating their policy preferences (particularly if the judge is a
policy maximizer) or as their view of the optimal legal position. Finally, these two
factors interact with the third—the standard of review selected by the judge.56
We will assume, for now, that the selection of the standard of review is exogenous
(that is, the judge does not choose the standard of review to get to a particular
result). In Canada, there are currently two standards of review—correctness,
where the judge specifies what they believe is the right result, and reasonableness,
under which the judge defers to the initial decision maker either fully (the naive
deference view) or partially (the sophisticated deference position).
Assume that if Cabinet has to react following judicial review, the costs
(including the potential for no development) move the policy to C1. What
happens if the judge is much more “liberal” than Cabinet—in fact, so liberal that
their preferred point is to the left of C1? Cabinet must make its decision in the
face of possibly being overturned by the court on judicial review. If it knows the
judge is naively deferential and the standard of review is reasonableness, Cabinet
can safely set its policy at its preferred point, knowing that the judge will defer
to its (Cabinet’s) view of the right decision. Take the opposite type of judge—the
56. See Canada (Minster of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].
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policy maximizer. Both Cabinet and the judge know that if the judge quashes
a Cabinet decision at C and imposes their own preferred view, Cabinet will
respond by altering the legislation to its best alternative in the circumstances—
C1. This, in fact, is true of any Cabinet decision to the right of C1. With a weak
preference not to be overruled and a rational expectations assumption, Cabinet
has no incentive to choose any policy greater than C1 and the judge no incentive
to overturn this decision. For the same reason, in all other instances where the
judge’s preference (including their space of reasonable outcomes) lies to the left
of C1, the outcome will be C1.
Consider next a judge who is much more “conservative” than Cabinet—
that is, their preferred policy lies relatively far to the right of Cabinet’s preferred
policy. As before, if the judge is naively deferential and the standard of review is
reasonableness, Cabinet can enact its preferred policy (C) as the judge will not
overturn it. Again, take the opposite type of judge—the policy maximizer. If the
judge chooses their preferred policy, Cabinet will react with legislation and the
result will be C1. However, imagine a policy, C2, for which Cabinet is essentially
indifferent between C2 and C1. At C2, for example, there is more development
than Cabinet prefers but without the costs of new legislation or the reduction in
the probability of the project proceeding. On review, the judge would impose C2
as Cabinet would be indifferent between that policy and C1 and so would not
enact legislation, and the judge would be closer to their preferred policy. Cabinet
can only safely choose C2 if it prefers not being overturned and is indifferent
between C2 and C1.
Finally, judges may have views only slightly more liberal or conservative than
Cabinet, such that C1<“J”<C2. In such cases, Cabinet will still choose its preferred
policy (C) when faced with a naively deferential judge, as the judge would not
overturn their decision. If the judge is willing to impose their own policy (that
is, not just quash the decision but order the particular outcome), a judge using
a standard of review of correctness would impose their own preferred policy (J)
knowing that Cabinet would have no incentive to overturn it (since it would
prefer J to C1—that is, it is not willing to bear the additional cost). Cabinet
would therefore choose J to avoid being overturned. The only exception to this
would be where the judge engages in sophisticated deference—that is, provides
some space (we can refer to as between the lower bound, “JL,” and the upper
bound, “JU”) for there to be some other “reasonable” policy than the judge’s
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preferred policy.57 Cabinet would then choose the lower bound (JL) of the more
conservative sophisticated judge’s range and the upper bound (JU) of the more
liberal sophisticated judge’s range. Cabinet is then able to get slightly closer to its
preferred outcome (C).
Table 1 sets out the outcomes for the different types of judges. Cabinet faced
with a naively deferential judge, whether liberal or conservative, will choose its
own preferred policy. Where the judges are much more liberal or conservative
than Cabinet, the threat of judicial review pulls the Cabinet in the direction of
the judge, with the distance depending on the costs imposed by the delay and
uncertainty of losing on judicial review. Where the judge is similar to the Cabinet
in preference, Cabinet will move towards the judge’s preferred outcome (either
fully or partially, depending on whether the standard of review is correctness or
reasonableness) as that is preferred to the costs of delay and uncertainty.
TABLE 1: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE AND BY STANDARD
OF REVIEW—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISION (NO DUTY TO CONSULT)
JUDGE

NAIVE
DEFERENCE

SOPHISTICATED
DEFERENCE

POLICY
MAXIMIZER

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

J<C1

C

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1<J<C

C

J

JU

J

J

J

C<J<C2

C

J

JL

J

J

J

J>C2

C

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

NOTE: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, another
who defers in a more sophisticated fashion, and another who maximizes their policy
preferences). The rows indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure
1. “JU” refers to the upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find
reasonable, and “JL” is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would
find reasonable.

57. This notion of a policy space extracts from the nuances of the standard but serves to
differentiate the types of judges. See also Vavilov, supra note 56. The Court states “a
reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of
analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision
maker. The reasonableness standard requires that a reviewing court defer to such a decision”
(ibid at para 85). It requires consideration of both the outcome and the reasoning process
(ibid at para 87).
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For administrative law decisions then, the type and ideology of the judge
matters in this model but only in limited respects. Naive deference means no
actual check on Cabinet decision making, regardless of the preferred policy of
the judge. A more extreme judge in terms of policy preferences shifts Cabinet
in their direction, regardless of the type of judge (other than naive deference),
as both sides have the possibility of applying for judicial review. For judges closer
to Cabinet preferences, the judges’ preferences may lead to their choices directly
playing out. The court influences the policy chosen even if no judicial review is
actually undertaken where Cabinet prefers not to be overturned. One implication
of this overall dynamic may be that in Canada, where parties have held power for
a considerable period of time in the past, if there is a change of government after
a long stint of a different stripe of government appointing judges, the preferences
of judges may shift to the opposite side of Cabinet or to a more extreme position.
B. CABINET, THE COURTS, AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT

Adding in the constitutional duty to consult brings a few changes. First, Cabinet
is no longer the final decision maker—that is, given that the duty to consult is a
constitutional issue, in theory legislative supremacy no longer holds and Cabinet’s
ability to resort to legislation is removed. There may be ways for Cabinet to bake
certain types of biases into legislation, thereby affecting deference.58 However,
on an individual decision, we will assume that the legislation is fixed and Cabinet
cannot resort to changes for that decision. Second, access to the courts is no
longer bilateral—only Indigenous groups can seek judicial review of a decision
on the basis that the Crown has not fulfilled its duty to consult.
Again, begin by considering a judge who is much more “liberal” than Cabinet
(J<C1). If the standard of review is reasonableness and the judge is naively
deferential, Cabinet can choose its preferred outcome (C), as in the standard
administrative law case. On the other hand, if the judge is deferential in a more
sophisticated manner, the best Cabinet can do is JU—the upper bound of the
range of reasonableness for that judge. If the judge is a policy maximizer, or if the
standard of review for any type of judge is correctness, the best Cabinet can do is
the judge’s preferred point (J). As it turns out, the same is true if the judge is only
slightly more liberal than Cabinet (C1<J<C).
At the opposite extreme, consider a judge who is much more “conservative”
than Cabinet (J>C2). Cabinet facing a naively deferential judge and a standard
of review of reasonableness can still choose its preferred option (C). Also similar
58. See Promislow & Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law,” supra note 1.
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to the previous case of a liberal judge, under a standard of review of correctness
or with a policy-maximizing judge, the best Cabinet can do is the judge’s (now
much more conservative) preferred outcome (J). The only difference is the case
of a standard of review of reasonableness and a sophisticatedly deferential judge.
The best Cabinet can now do is the lower bound of the judge’s reasonableness
space (JL). Sophisticated deference therefore narrows the range of outcomes from
correctness review. The same results occur in the constitutional context for judges
who are only slightly more conservative than Cabinet (C<J<C2).
TABLE 2: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE AND BY STANDARD
OF REVIEW—DUTY TO CONSULT
JUDGE

NAIVE
DEFERENCE

SOPHISTICATED
DEFERENCE

POLICY
MAXIMIZER

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

J<C1

C

J

JU

J

J

J

C1<J<C

C

J

JU

J

J

J

C<J<C2

C

J

JL

J

J

J

J>C2

C

J

JL

J

J

J

NOTE: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, another
who defers in a more sophisticated fashion, and another who maximizes their policy
preferences). The rows indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure
1. “JU” refers to the upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find
reasonable, and “JL” is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would
find reasonable. The table assumes the judge is willing to impose their own view (not
merely quash and return to the original decision maker).

What then is the difference if Cabinet faces a constitutional constraint?
Table 2 sets out the outcomes in the constitutional context. When the judge’s
preferences are similar to those of Cabinet (either slightly more liberal or slightly
more conservative), the outcome is the same for a standard administrative law
decision (as seen in Table 1). In addition, judges with any type of preference,
if they are naively deferential, then Cabinet can again choose its preferred outcome
(C) without fear of being overturned. However, when the judge’s preferences are
more extreme, the outcomes from there being a constitutional duty become more
extreme. The outcomes are no longer tempered by Cabinet override but shift to
the judge’s preference.
Given these outcomes, Indigenous groups’ preference as to the role of the
court should depend on the position of the judge relative to Cabinet. Where
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the judge is much more conservative than Cabinet (J>C2) in the sense of
favouring development, Indigenous groups should prefer a standard of review
of reasonableness. The outcome is much better than correctness if the judge
is naively deferential and at least somewhat better if the judge defers in a
sophisticated manner (with the size of the benefit depending on the size of the
reasonableness space). On the other hand, for a judge who is much more liberal
than Cabinet (J<C1), Indigenous groups will be better off with a correctness
standard. This standard would foreclose the possibility of the Cabinet getting
its preferred outcome (C) and would limit the downside from a sophisticatedly
deferential judge.
What does this tell us about the Court’s current approach to standard
of review and its hope that the parties will engage in negotiation rather than
litigation? Recall that the current standard of review approach (to the extent that
the Court articulates one) is a limited form of correctness review for determining
the level of consultation required but reasonableness for the content of the duty,
including the nature of accommodation required.
To understand the impact of this standard of review, we need to at least
in part relax the assumption of all parties being perfectly rational and having
full information since otherwise there would be no litigation. Consider first a
judge who is more liberal than Cabinet (either because they were appointed
by a prior administration or the Cabinet position shifted to the right). A strict
reasonableness standard of review would strengthen the threat point of Cabinet
since Cabinet can credibly threaten a position that is further to the right
(possibly even its own preferred outcome (C)). Indigenous groups in this case
would, on the margin, rather negotiate than risk litigation. The mixed standard
complicates the picture somewhat as correctness strengthens the threat point
for the Indigenous group. Correctness would increase the risk of litigation by
increasing the probability of Indigenous groups gaining from litigation. In fact,
a judge may be able to effectively make the standard of review into correctness if
they want to overturn a more “conservative” outcome, since they can choose their
own level of consultation.
If the judge is more conservative than Cabinet, either because they were
appointed by a prior administration or because the Cabinet position has shifted
to the left (Cabinet has become more liberal), the story is even more complicated.
The standard of review will essentially be reasonableness. A judge seems unlikely
to use the correctness standard to find that more is owed to an Indigenous group
where they are more conservative or, if they did use the correctness standard,
find that that position has not been met. If the judge is willing to impose their
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views of the proper level of consultation and accommodation, reasonableness
somewhat weakens the threat point for Cabinet relative to correctness, as Cabinet
cannot credibly threaten any worse an outcome from litigation than JL, and
there is a potential for a naively deferential judge to find that the appropriate
policy is C. This standard then increases the strength for Indigenous groups and,
on the margins, increases the risk of litigation as opposed to negotiation (that
is, the Indigenous groups are more likely to view the outcome of litigation as
worth the risk).
However, there is one further wrinkle. What happens if the judge is likely
only to quash the decision (that is, not impose its view)? This remedy seems
more likely in the duty to consult case with relatively conservative judges.
If an Indigenous group, for example, challenges a Cabinet decision at C, a judge
may seem unlikely (or unable) to impose less procedure (that is, to take away
procedure already given, unless the decision is not already made), and judges
may be reluctant to second guess Cabinet to say that the honour of the Crown
demands less accommodation than is already given. In this case, the result would
then be asymmetrical. Where the judge is more liberal than Cabinet, they may be
willing to impose their view of greater procedure or accommodation, and, in any
event, the threat of quashing moves Cabinet towards the judge’s position. Where
the judge is more conservative, they may be only willing to quash decisions,
in which case the judge would uphold any decision to its left, regardless of the
standard of review (recall that only Indigenous groups can bring duty to consult
claims, meaning they are going to be asking for more process or accommodation).
In that case, the best that Indigenous groups can hope for would be that they can
threaten to impose a cost on Cabinet (both the cost of litigation itself and delay
in the project) if Cabinet attempts to apply its optimal position (C). Its best hope
is then to negotiate with Cabinet to move it towards C1 through the threat of
litigation—that is, to the position Cabinet would be in following litigation. The
threat will be credible; the Indigenous group knows it will lose but at least it may
move the position a little to the left. Cabinet then has some incentive to attempt
to negotiate to reduce the probability of litigation.
The result is that the Supreme Court’s current mixed strategy has two
effects. First, the approach somewhat strengthens the position of Indigenous
groups relative to Cabinet by weakening the threat point of Cabinet, regardless
of whether the judge is more or less conservative than Cabinet. The exception is
where a judge is unwilling to impose their views (i.e., will only uphold or quash a
decision) and is more conservative than Cabinet. In that case, both reasonableness
and correctness weaken the threat point of Indigenous groups, as there is no
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realistic potential for the decision to be quashed. Their threat becomes dependent
on the cost of delay in both monetary terms and risk that the project will not be
undertaken (and contingent on Indigenous groups having resources to credibly
make such a threat).
Second, and relatedly, the approach increases the risk of litigation rather than
negotiation. If the judge is more conservative than Cabinet, to the extent there
is any uncertainty about the type of judge (that is, that the judge may be naively
deferential) and judges impose their own policy preferences, reasonableness
means that Indigenous groups have some greater probability of gain from
litigation than under correctness. If the judge will only quash, Indigenous groups
facing a conservative judge may still be willing to bear the costs of litigation,
as it moves Cabinet towards C1. If the judge is more liberal, Indigenous groups
have greater incentive to litigate given the correctness aspect of the test, as that
may increase their probability of moving the policy to the left. The result is then
that the current Court model enhances the bargaining position of Indigenous
groups generally but with a higher probability of litigation on the margin.

III. DOES ADDING AN “INDEPENDENT” AGENCY MAKE A
DIFFERENCE?
Next, consider the case of the legislature delegating the approval decision to
some other “independent” decision maker—that is, a public body that is not
the Cabinet or a line ministry, such as the Ministry of Natural Resources. In the
pipeline example, we can think of the NEB (we will use the NEB as opposed to
the CER to tie in with the language of recent court decisions). Depending on
the structure set in the legislation delegating the power, this body may be more
or less independent of Cabinet. Cabinet may control the body through a range
of means such as the granting of appointments, the threat of removal or of not
reappointing a member, the establishment of guidelines for decision making, and
the implementation of a budget for the decision maker .59

59. Andrew Green, “Delegation and Consultation: How the Administrative State Functions
and the Importance of Rules” in Flood & Sossin, eds, supra note 1, 307 at 320-21 [Green,
“Delegation and Consultation”]. See also Clyde River, supra note 2. This notion of the
connection between the body and the Cabinet has not been fully recognized by the Supreme
Court of Canada, which has stated that there is “no relationship of control” between the
Crown (Cabinet, in effect) and such bodies (ibid at para 29).
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A. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISIONS

As with the case of Cabinet being the sole decision maker, first consider a purely
administrative law decision that does not involve the duty to consult. In this case,
the sequence of the decision-making process is as follows:
1. A company proposes the pipeline and applies to the executive body
(the “Board”) for approval.
2. The legislature has empowered the Board to approve or deny
the application following some decision-making process. The
Board may impose conditions on the project. The second step is
then for the Board to approve or deny the application, subject to
any conditions.
3. If the Board approves the pipeline, an environmental group or the
proponent has to decide whether to apply for judicial review of the
(possibly conditional) approval.
4. If one of them applies for judicial review of the decision, a court
then either quashes the decision or allows it to stand.
5. If the court quashes the decision, Cabinet then has a choice of
implementing a decision that the court will accept or having the
legislature amend the legislation to either directly or indirectly
allow the approval.60 Thus, Cabinet still has the last word, but the
Board is the first mover.61
As seen in Figure 2, we will assume that there is some difference between
the preferences of the decision maker (“B”) and that of Cabinet (“C”), with the
size of the difference depending on the degree of independence of the body.
Note that the difference may come from different preferences of the members
of the decision maker and Cabinet or, even if Cabinet appointed individuals
with similar preferences to their own, from some use of the body’s expertise in a
non-political fashion. The decision maker may lie to the left of Cabinet at BL (as
in Figure 2(a)) or the right of Cabinet at BC (as in Figure 2(b)).

60. That is, Cabinet proposes legislation that either explicitly allows this project or indirectly
does so by altering the statute to overcome whatever defect the court found in the
decision-making process.
61. For an administrative law problem with a similar sequence see Ferejohn &
Weingast, supra note 49.

552

(2020) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

FIGURE 2: PREFERENCES OF CABINET, THE BOARD, THE PROPONENT, AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP
(a) Board More “Liberal” than Cabinet

(b) Board More “Conservative” than Cabinet

NOTES: The line provides the array of possible policy outcomes from least development, on the
left, to most development, on the right. The points represent the preferred outcomes for an
environmental group (“E”), Cabinet (“C”), an executive decision maker which is “liberal”
(“BL”) or “conservative” (“BC”), and the proponent (“P”). C1 is the outcome preferred by
Cabinet minus the cost of delay (including loss of government revenue and the decreased
probability that the pipeline will be built) and C2 is the point to the right of C where
Cabinet is indifferent to C1.

Given that the Board gets to make the first move, it may be able to forestall
reaction by either the courts or by Cabinet, if it chooses properly. The analysis
is similar to where Cabinet is the primary decision maker, but there are a few
differences. First, where the judge is naively deferential and the standard of review
is reasonableness, the judge will be deferring to the Board. The Board can forestall
being overturned by either the Court or Cabinet if it sets its policy as closer to
that of Cabinet but where Cabinet will not want to act. Where the Board is
more liberal than Cabinet, it would set its policy at C1 and, if more conservative,
at C2. Adding in the independent decision maker then moves the policy decision
away from Cabinet’s preferred position (C)—where it was when Cabinet was
the decision maker—towards the Board but not completely to the position of
the Board. A second difference exists when the judge is sophisticated but has
non-extreme preferences (C1<J<C2). In each case, a more liberal board will be
able to set its policy at the lower end of the judge’s policy space at best (and
conservative at the upper end). The Board can then exert at least a small pull in
its direction using the span of reasonableness offered by the judge.
As seen in Table 3, for all other cases, the outcomes are the same where
there is no constitutional component, regardless of whether the decision maker is
Cabinet or a board. The more liberal judges pull the decision in a liberal direction
and the more conservative in a more conservative direction. The result is that
if the “independent” decision maker has preferences that align with your own
relative to Cabinet (for example, an environmental group and a liberal board
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or a proponent and a conservative board), you would prefer reasonableness
regardless of the type or ideological preference of the judge, with the best being
a naively deferential judge. If the “independent” agency’s preference is opposed
to yours relative to Cabinet, then you would prefer correctness regardless of the
preferences of the judge, with the worst being a naively deferential judge acting
under a reasonableness standard.
TABLE 3: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE, BY POSITION OF
BOARD, AND BY STANDARD OF REVIEW—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISION (NO
DUTY TO CONSULT)
(a) Board More “Liberal” than Cabinet
JUDGE

NAIVE
DEFERENCE

SOPHISTICATED
DEFERENCE

POLICY
MAXIMIZER

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

J<C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1<J<C

C1

J

JL

J

J

J

C<J<C2

C1

J

JL

J

J

J

J>C2

C1

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

(b) Board More “Conservative” than Cabinet
JUDGE

NAIVE
DEFERENCE

SOPHISTICATED
DEFERENCE

POLICY
MAXIMIZER

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

J<C1

C2

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1<J<C

C2

J

JU

J

J

J

C<J<C2

C2

J

JU

J

J

J

J>C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

C2

NOTES: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, who defers
in a more sophisticated fashion, and who maximizes their policy preferences). The rows
indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure 1. “JU” refers to the
upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable, and “JL”
is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable.

B. “INDEPENDENT” BODIES, THE COURTS, AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT

How does this change if we now add in the duty to consult where a board is
making the decision? Table 4 sets out the outcomes where there is a board deciding
in the context of the duty to consult. First, consider a naively deferential judge.

554

(2020) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

When Cabinet was the final decision maker, it could choose its preferred policy
(C). Adding an “independent” agency in the non-constitutional context shifted
the policy in the direction of the Board. In the context of a constitutional duty
to consult, a board faced with a naively deferential judge and a reasonableness
standard can shift the policy even further, all the way to its preferred policy (either
BL or BC, whether more or less liberal than Cabinet, respectively), as Cabinet
cannot enact legislation to counteract the judge’s determination.
TABLE 4: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE, BY POSITION OF
BOARD, AND BY STANDARD OF REVIEW—DUTY TO CONSULT
(a) Board More “Liberal” than Cabinet
JUDGE

NAIVE
DEFERENCE

SOPHISTICATED
DEFERENCE

POLICY
MAXIMIZER

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

J<C1

BL

J

J

J

J

J

C1<J<C

BL

J

JL

J

J

J

C<J<C2

BL

J

JL

J

J

J

J>C2

BL

J

JL

J

J

J

(b) Board More “Conservative” than Cabinet
JUDGE

NAIVE
DEFERENCE

SOPHISTICATED
DEFERENCE

POLICY
MAXIMIZER

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

Reasonable

Correct

J <C1

BC

J

JU

J

J

J

C1<J<C

BC

J

JU

J

J

J

C<J<C2

BC

J

JU

J

J

J

J>C2

BC

J

J

J

J

J

NOTES: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, who defers
in a more sophisticated fashion, and who maximizes their policy preferences). The rows
indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure 1. “JU” refers to the
upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable and “JL”
is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable. “BL”
refers to the optimal position for a board that is more “liberal” (to the left) of Cabinet and
“BC” for a board that is more “conservative” (to the right) of Cabinet.

Second, for extreme judges (those much more liberal or conservative than
Cabinet), where the judge is willing to impose their own decision (as opposed
to quash), the outcome will be more extreme. In the non-constitutional context,
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the outcome moves to C1 or C2 where the decision maker is either Cabinet or
a board. In the constitutional context, the outcome moves out to the judge’s
preferred outcome (J) or, depending on the relative position of the Board and the
judge, perhaps even the extreme end of the judge’s policy range (if the standard is
reasonableness). Finally, for judges with similar preferences to those of Cabinet,
the outcomes are the same in the constitutional and non-constitutional cases
(except, as noted, where the judge is naively deferential and the standard of
review is reasonableness).
Given these outcomes, the relative ordering of reasonableness and
correctness in general appears to remain the same in the constitutional as in
the non-constitutional case—reasonableness if the Board is aligned with your
preferences (regardless of the position of the judge), and correctness if the Board
is opposed to your preferences (again, regardless of the position of the judge).
However, remember that only Indigenous peoples can bring duty to consult
applications. This asymmetry means Cabinet is no longer central to the analysis
but, instead, the focus is on the location of the Board relative to the judge.
Indigenous peoples are not likely to challenge a decision where the judge is to the
right of the Board (as they will lose), although, again, there may be some delay
value.62 When the judge is to the left of the Board, the Indigenous group may
challenge its decisions, with correctness giving them a stronger position than
reasonableness.
Does this analysis tell us anything different about the Court’s chosen
standard of review in the context of a board as the final decision maker? Consider
a board that is more liberal than Cabinet. Where the judge is to the left of the
Board, Indigenous groups may be able to get the decision quashed through either
the correctness or the reasonableness standard, with the exception of a naively
deferential judge using a standard of reasonableness. If the judge is to the right of
the Board, the Indigenous groups cannot credibly threaten litigation (except for
the delay value) regardless of the standard and may then focus on negotiation.
Similarly, when the Board is more conservative than Cabinet, a judge to the
left of the Board increases the value and probability of litigation for Indigenous
groups, and a judge to the right of the Board forecloses the threat of litigation.

62. Recall that we are working with an assumption of perfect information for now. However,
the parties are not likely to know the identity of the judge (or panel of judges) until after an
application for judicial review is launched. You could think in terms of the parties having
knowledge of the median judge on the relevant court which would then bring in the parties’
expected outcomes.
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As a result, if Cabinet relies on a board to fulfill the duty to consult, the basic
structure of the problem remains the same. The Court’s approach increases the
threat point (and possibility of litigation) for Indigenous groups when the judge
is to the left of the decision maker. When the judge is to the right, Indigenous
groups have no real prospect of succeeding and there should therefore be less
litigation, unless Indigenous groups are using the litigation for the delay value
(that is, to extract more from negotiations or reduce the probability of the
project due to the uncertainty). The effect of having a board rather than Cabinet
as the decision maker, though, can be quite stark depending on the relative
positions of the actors.

IV. NEGOTIATION AND LITIGATION
The duty to consult raises difficult questions about the scope of the duty, who
gets to decide how and whether the duty is fulfilled, and the substantive value
of the duty. In this article, we use a simple positive political theory model to
try to map some of the strategic concerns underlying the relationship between
the principal parties. The contours of the problem are smoothed out by various
limiting assumptions, such as the rationality of the parties and knowledge about
the relative position of each of the actors. However, the model allows us to see
some of the basic paths that influence decisions.
The underlying layout of the choices can be seen most easily where the
administrative law decision does not raise constitutional issues. Judicial review
shifts decisions in the direction of the preferences of the reviewing court, except
where the judge is willing to completely defer to the views of the executive
decision maker. This shift occurs because challenges are two-sided, in the sense
that parties on both sides of a particular issue can apply for judicial review.
Where either Cabinet or an “independent” body makes the initial determination,
Cabinet still retains the final say after judicial review. However, the sequence of
decision making matters. If Cabinet is the initial decision maker and dislikes
being overruled by the courts, it will not choose its preferred policy but a policy
that will not be overturned, taking into account whether the reviewing judge is
more liberal or more conservative than itself. If an “independent” body is the
initial decision maker, the body can use its first-mover advantage to forestall both
judicial review and Cabinet or legislative override. In that case, the Board does
not choose its optimal policy but a policy more in line with that of Cabinet,
regardless of the preferences of the reviewing court. The exception is where the
judge is naively deferential to the initial decision maker. In that case, Cabinet can

Green, Judicial Influence 557

choose its preferred policy, but a board must still act in the shadow of Cabinet
override and therefore must moderate its choice to reduce the probability of
Cabinet override.
This simple model highlights a few features of the relationship between the
executive, the courts, and the affected parties. First, the interaction between the
views and the type of reviewing judge is important to the final outcome. The views
of the judge are irrelevant where the judge is naively deferential and the standard
of review is reasonableness. Correctness makes the type of judge irrelevant (on
the assumption that correctness allows the judge to adopt what they feel is the
best outcome). It is the combination of reasonableness and different views that
plays some role in the outcome.
Second, the first-mover advantage of the “independent” agency provides it
with a limited ability to shape decisions towards its own preferences. However,
it is Cabinet’s last move that shapes the agency’s choices. Judicial review in this
model of administrative decisions is then somewhat democratic if that means
shaping decisions in the light of Cabinet’s preference over this particular decision.
At least where there is complete information and the parties behave rationally,
the Board’s initial decision will stand but will reflect Cabinet’s views as well.63
The interaction of the different players provides some context for criticisms of
the Court’s approach to administrative law over time. Support for more or less
deference may depend on your assumptions about the positions of the different
actors relative to each other but also relative to your own general policy preferences.
This connection between support for deference and policy preferences has and is
playing out in the United States. Support for and criticism of their administrative
framework, including the Chevron doctrine, is aligned with political leanings—
with conservatives initially supporting its underlying deference when it was in
line with a more conservative set of policies but more recently criticizing it,
seeing it as fostering an expansive regulatory state.64 Similarly, in Canada, one
question that arises is whether there is a connection between support for a more
or less deferential approach and the assumptions about the nature and relative
orientation of the judiciary relative to government.
Third, the Court has stated that, “[r]easonableness is a single standard that
takes its colour from the context.”65 The nature of the deference analysis changes
63. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47.
64. See Cass R Sunstein, “Chevron as Law” (2019) 107 Geo LJ 1613 (discussing the different
views of Chevron over time and its correlation with political ideology).
65. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59. See also Vavilov,
supra note 56 at para 85.
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with, for example, the nature of the decision maker and the decision. The result
seems to be that where, for example, Cabinet is deciding a broad question (such
as whether a pipeline is in the “national interest”), judges are likely to be very
close to naive deference. For example, the Federal Court of Appeal in Gitxaala,
dealing with approval of the Northern Gateway Pipeline, stated that Cabinet:66
was entitled to assess the sufficiency of the information and recommendations it
had received, balance all the considerations—economic, cultural, environmental
and otherwise—and come to the conclusion it did. To rule otherwise would be to
second-guess [Cabinet’s] appreciation of the facts, its choice of policy, its access to
scientific expertise and its evaluation and weighing of competing public interest
considerations, matters very much outside the ken of the courts.

Boards, on the other hand, may not get such a high level of deference and
therefore may be more likely to face a version of sophisticated deference. These
differences will potentially impact the pull of the courts and the nature of the
dynamic at play.
Finally, the model shows the importance of the reason for and structure of
the “independent” agency. Cabinet may establish these agencies for a number
of reasons. As we discussed, Cabinet may be attempting to have the decision
taken on the basis of expertise or may wish for decisions to be made that are
independent of political influence for other reasons (such as credibility or policy
stability). The difference between Cabinet’s optimal policy and that of the Board
is meant to reflect these values. The pull of the decision towards the views of
Cabinet in the model serves, in part, to undermine these reasons. At the same
time, the Board’s ability to pull away policy from Cabinet’s preferred outcome at
least shows some effect of creating these bodies. We have, of course, assumed that
there is some independence of the Board. To the extent that the Cabinet creates
a body that mimics its own preferences, then the two cases (either Cabinet or the
Board being the initial decision maker) collapse into one. Cabinet could create
such a board for efficiency reasons (to allow its preferences to prevail over a wider
range of decisions without having to be involved in the decision)67 or possibly
to provide the illusion of independent (perhaps expert) decision making without
the risk of unwanted policy decisions.
66. Gitxaala, supra note 20 at para 157.
67. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47 at 8. In a slightly different context, Ferejohn and
Shipan point out that the question then becomes: Why does Parliament or Cabinet delegate
to the Board if they are not providing answers that are consistent with Cabinet’s preferences?
Their answer is that there are likely efficiency gains and Cabinet retains the power to review
and alter ultimate policy decisions.
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The constitutional context, particularly that of the duty to consult,
brings greater complexity, in part because challenges are now one-sided—only
by Indigenous groups. There are a number of departures from the straight
administrative law case. First, naively deferential judges lead to even starker
outcomes, if operating under a reasonableness standard. Where Cabinet is
the initial decision maker, the decision rests at their preferred outcome (that
is, the preferred outcome of an elected, majoritarian body), even though it is a
constitutional issue. However, where a board is involved, the outcomes shift out
to its preferred outcome and, depending on the makeup of the body, the swing
could be quite significant.
Second, the one-sided nature of the challenges under this model means that
any challenge facing a judge whose preferences lie to the right of the initial decision
maker will fail. The result will be either fewer challenges in such cases or only
challenges where the challenge has a delay value (such as reducing the probability
of the development). Where the judge lies to the left of the decision maker (that
is, substantively more aligned with the Indigenous group), the Court’s standard
should foster litigation—the combined correctness/reasonableness standard
providing a greater incentive for litigation relative to reasonableness alone,
as it increases the probability of success. Part of your view of the effect of the duty
to consult framework will depend on your view of the likely relative position of
Cabinet as opposed to judges. If you believe judges will tend to have preferences
very close to or to the left of Cabinet, the result would likely be greater litigation.
Third, this effect on probability of success makes the position of the initial
decision maker important to the probability of litigation versus negotiation.
Consider the two positions of the board relative to Cabinet. A “liberal” board
should face less litigation than Cabinet, not only because its preferences lie to
the left of Cabinet, but also because it is less likely that there will be judges
whose views lie to the left of the Board than of Cabinet. The Board may not
provide a significantly better policy than Cabinet from the perspective of the
Indigenous group (such as where their preferred level of development is none),
but the probability of success in litigation may be significantly reduced. For the
same reason, a “conservative” board will face much higher levels of litigation than
Cabinet and certainly more than a “liberal” board.
The outcome will then depend on the relationship between the parties. Again,
it points to the need to carefully consider the structure of any decision-making
body. Cabinet may be able to use its powers of appointment, for example, to shift
the location of the Board to obtain particular results, which may have impacts
even within a constitutional setting. The Court’s claim that these boards and
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agencies are “independent of control” of Cabinet is not true in almost all cases,
given the control Cabinet has on appointment and other aspects of these bodies’
existence and mandate.68 Further, its claim that these bodies can act as neutral
arbiters of constitutional issues, such as the duty to consult (not to mention
other constitutional questions), requires an ability and willingness to ignore the
pull of Cabinet which is, at its core, an empirical question. This pull exists even
without getting into the more basic levels of control by the legislature raised by
Metallic who argues that where the substance of the enabling legislation is biased
to begin with, deference leads to biased decisions.69 In the constitutional context,
Cabinet may not be able to change an existing decision of the Court, but it may
be able to shape that decision ex ante or future decisions ex post by changing the
nature of the delegation (and perhaps, for example, the level of deference offered
by the courts).
As Audrey Macklin notes, in the Charter context, we need judges to police
Charter rights because they are independent from the legislature and the executive.
She argues that in the Charter context, “decisions by elected officials (legislators)
are distrusted precisely because they might be inclined to trade off individual
rights in the name of political gain.”70 We worry about deferring to those who
are close to the political branch in this context. The same holds true for the duty
to consult. This model of constitutional decision making is applicable to many
more general Charter challenges implicating administrative decision makers.
Further, independence has an important connection to expertise. Expertise
may provide a measure of independence to a decision maker where the expertise
ties the decision maker into professional or reputational norms (for example,
doctors may have certain norms of decision making in the context of medical
decisions).71 The fact that the individual or body is an expert may make it
more likely that they are able, or feel obligated, to make decisions in line with
that expertise, as opposed to submitting to political considerations. However,
there is an equally as strong (or even stronger) tie in the other direction. Some
measure of independence may be necessary to be sure that expertise is actually
being exercised. If we feel that expertise allows better decisions about Indigenous
68. For a discussion of the issue of the expertise and independence of the NEB, see Graben &
Sinclair, supra note 13. Graben and Sinclair studied NEB decisions implicating the duty to
consult. See generally Green, “Delegation and Consultation,” supra note 59.
69. See “Legal Frameworks,” supra note 6.
70. Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the
Charter” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 561 at 574 [Macklin, “Charter Right”].
71. See Adrian Vermeule, “Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the
Administrative State” (2017) 130 Harv L Rev 2463.
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claims, we need to be sure it is actually being exercised and decisions are not being
altered to meet political demands. As a possible example, in their study of NEB
decisions, Graben and Sinclair found that the NEB does not use appropriate
legal standards to assess whether the duty to consult has been met.72 Judges
deferring to politically accountable actors on constitutional rights on the basis
that they have expertise raises concerns about whether that expertise is actually
being exercised. The duty to consult context may be different than the Charter
context in this sense. In the Charter context, Macklin notes that judges should
decide, as they may have both expertise and independence.73 However, in the
duty to consult context, there may be more of a trade-off between expertise and
independence. There are considerable context-specific decisions that judges may
not have relative expertise to make but do have the independence. We need to
think about how the trade-off affects the final decision.74
This simple model shows some potential influences on decision making,
particularly from the strategic interaction of different parties to decisions. It applies
to administrative law decisions generally, as well as to constitutional questions
beyond the duty to consult. However, like any model, it is a simplification and
rests on some fairly strong assumptions. The assumptions about perfect rationality
and full information are obviously false and would result in no litigation at all,
but they provide some insight into the general pull from the context. One basic
piece of information that is missing upfront is the identity of the judge or judges
that will hear the application. This information is not revealed until after the
application is launched. However, you may have some information about the
average preferences of judges on the relevant bench relative to Cabinet or a
board. The variance of the judges’ preferences would be much higher than that of
Cabinet (which would depend on the median minister or perhaps just the Prime
Minister) or a board, as judges will be appointed over time and, moreover, sit
in panels (and, on lower courts, sit alone). The partial exception is the Supreme
Court of Canada which has only nine members, but, even there, the Chief Justice
72. Graben & Sinclair, supra note 13 at 415.
73. “Charter Right,” supra note 70 at 578-79.
74. See David Mullan, “Unresolved Issues on Standard of Review in Canadian Judicial Review
of Administrative Action —The Top Fifteen!” (2013) 42 Adv Q 1. Mullan has pointed to
this connection in the general administrative law setting. In the statutory interpretation
context, judges may be more hesitant to defer to ministers than adjudicative tribunals out
of fear that ministers will not base their decisions on their expertise. Mullan also notes that
tribunals which are not actually independent should perhaps not benefit from a presumption
of expertise. See also Hodgson, supra note 6 (for an argument in support of consideration of
a specialized tribunal to assess the adequacy of consultation).
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has the ability to choose the size and identity of the panel hearing the appeal,
thereby reducing the certainty in the preferences of the judges deciding the issue.75
The assumption that the problem is unidimensional and can be thought of as
being on a simple left/right, liberal/conservative line is also very strict and stylized.
The problems underlying the duty to consult and, in fact, other constitutional
and many administrative law contexts, are multi-dimensional. However, the
model is meant to illuminate the basic influences from these situations, even
though it abstracts from a realistic portrayal of these disputes.
We have also considered a few different types of judges—those that are
naively deferential to the executive decision maker, those that defer but in a more
circumspect manner based on their own baseline views, and those that aim for
their own preferred outcome. While we have said that the latter are aiming to
maximize their preferred policy, they could also be thought of as simply working
from their best view of the law (that is, in the terms of judicial decision making,
working from a legal model as opposed to an attitudinal model). The story can be
made more complex through different assumptions about these judges but these
three help with understanding some of the core questions about the differences
between reasonableness (and shades of reasonableness) and correctness.
Finally, we assume static preferences for the principal actors such as
the Cabinet, the Board, and even the Indigenous groups. This assumption is
potentially problematic in the context of the duty to consult, as one of the reasons
for consultation is to attempt to have the parties understand and internalize the
other parties’ views and concerns, with the possible alteration of what they see
as the optimal policy. This connection between procedure and substance and the
nature of these dynamics in the context of procedural questions is interesting.
On a basic level, you can use the same basic structure to think about procedural
choices—that is, with the line being an array of procedures from more to less,
with Indigenous groups seeking more to hopefully alter the substance of the
outcome and the executive seeking less to minimize cost and delay. However,
a more fulsome model would build the connection between substance and
process to a greater extent.
Given these assumptions, however, what can we say about the Court’s
approach to the duty to consult? The combination of the Court’s choice of
standard of review and the one-sided nature of the challenges means that the
impact of its approach depends on the relative positions of the relevant actors.
The incentive to litigate shifts as policy positions shift for Cabinet (such as
75. Benjamin Alarie, Andrew Green & Edward M Iacobucci, “Panel Selection on High Courts”
(2015) 65 UTLJ 335.
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following elections), for boards (again, following elections where new members
are appointed or structures are changed), or for judges (with new appointments
to the bench), but not in a straightforward fashion. Further, the interpretation
of the standard of review by different types of judges will impact these incentives
to litigate and the probability of success from litigation. The Court recognizes
that the duty to consult is not a static, objective exercise of applying the
constitution, but it underestimates the importance of the underlying dynamic
relationship between the main players. A simple call for greater negotiation will
not be effective without considering how to use these relationships to build the
incentives for all parties to negotiate rather than become bound in seemingly
endless cycles of litigation.

